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Modalities in Scientific Representation

The aim of this blog is to present the result of my Marie Skłodowska-Curie research project "Modalities in Scientific Representation", realised in Madrid between September 2021 and December 2023 (which was in direct continutation with my project realised at UNAM between 2019-2023).

A large spectrum of discourse in science is typically analysed in modal terms, that is, in terms of what is possible or necessary. This includes scientific explanations, physical laws and constraints, causation, counterfactual reasoning and probabilities. There is a large amount of literature on the metaphysics of natural necessity in science at a general level, with proposed analyses in terms of governing laws of nature, or dispositions, etc. However, necessity comes in many varieties and other kinds of modalities than natural necessity are involved in scientific discourse. This is certainly the case for epistemic modality, involved, for example, in assessing the credibility of a hypothesis, but it can also be the case for logical, conceptual or normative modalities. It is not always easy to identify which kind of modality is involved in a piece of scientific reasoning, and this difficulty is a source of debate not only among philosophers, but also among physicists, for example concerning the interpretation of probabilities in quantum mechanics. Arguably, the lack of a systematic way to disentangle various kinds of modalities is an obstacle to a finer understanding of what science tells us about the world.

The aim of this project is to overcome this problem pragmatically, by connecting the topic of modalities with that of scientific representation. Debates on scientific representation concern the relationship between representational vehicles (e.g. models), their users and their targets. The project is to examine the representational status of various kinds of modalities and modal structures and their relationship: whether they are represented, or whether they play a role in the very act of representing, for example, in assessing the accuracy or credibility of a model. The purpose is to arrive at a means of distinguishing different kinds of modalities pragmatically, so as to provide tools for interpreting the modal aspect of scientific theories and scientific discourse more precisely.

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Bonus: A Puzzle about Conceptual Changes

Let us say a bit more about a puzzle that came about in previous posts. Let p be "the sum of the angles of a triangle is lower than 180 degrees" and C a modal operator "it is conceivable that". Consider the situation before anyone even conceived of non-euclidean geometries as a consistent alternative to euclidean geometry. Then, intuitively speaking, p was not conceivable (¬Cp). But we now know that p is true of some triangles, because the geometry of the universe is non-euclidean (p). On the other hand, it is quite natural to think that conceptual modality is factive, that is, that if something stems from conceptual necessity, then it is also true (¬C¬p→p), and this implies the converse, that if something is true, then it is conceivable (p→Cp). But these three premises are mutually inconsistent, hence our trilemma: one of the following statements must be false. ¬Cp p p→Cp So, we have exactly three options: (A) either we can claim that p always was...
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Epistemic Representation: The Basics

Now that we have reached a rough taxonomy of modalities, let us talk about representation. I think it will be enough to have this rough picture in mind, which, I reckon, should be uncontroversial aspects of representation: Inferentialism: An epistemic representation (such as a scientific model, a map, a realistic drawing) can be used to make inferences about target systems of a relevant kind in concrete situations. Misrepresentation: It is possible, for a representation, to represent its target inaccurately. I take inferentialism to be a minimalist theory of representation. This does not tell against theories that attempt to give more substance to representation, but only defines a common ground. As for the possibility of misrepresentation, it has been challenged notably on the ground that representation would be a “success term” or a thick term ( Poznic 2018 ; Chakravartty 2010, pp. 209–10 ), but I’m utterly unconvinced that this is the case. “Cruel” is a thick term, and...
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